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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This case returns to this Court upon grant 
of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, followed 
by vacatur and remand for further consideration in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 
1697 (2014). This appeal requires us to determine whether the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied “clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), when it permitted the 
admission into evidence of a confession by a non-testifying 
codefendant that redacted James Washington’s name and 
replaced it with the generic terms describing Washington and 
his role in the charged crimes. The District Court found that 
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this was an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
A. Factual History 
On February 24, 2000, James Washington, Willie 
Johnson, Romont Waddy, and James Taylor set out to rob a 
Dollar Express store at which Taylor worked. They met 
around midnight and drove to the store at around 4:15 AM. 
Washington drove the four men in a vehicle owned by one of 
his family members. Washington and Taylor remained in the 
vehicle while Waddy and Johnson entered the store. Upon 
encountering two store employees in the loading dock, 
Johnson shot and killed both. Johnson divided money 
removed from a safe and the men left the premises.  
Shortly thereafter, Taylor surrendered to police, gave a 
statement, and agreed to testify against the other men in 
exchange for a reduced sentence. Taylor identified 
Washington as the driver. Waddy also gave a statement to the 
police on March 5, 2000, and identified Washington as the 
driver. He added that Washington, after hearing the shots, 
entered the store and helped remove cash from the safe. 
Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried jointly 
before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County in October and November 2001. Taylor testified on 
October 25, 2011, identified all of the coconspirators, and 
discussed in detail their roles in the crime. He clearly and 
repeatedly identified Washington as the driver of the car. On 
cross-examination, Washington’s counsel pointed out 
significant inconsistencies in Taylor’s story, in addition to his 
history of substance abuse and admitted heavy impairment 
from drugs at the time of the incident in question. Four days 
later, on October 29, 2011, Detective John Cummings 
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testified. After the trial judge gave a limiting instruction, 
Cummings read a redacted version of Waddy’s confession 
over Washington’s objection. The jury never saw the original 
or redacted copy of the confession. Cummings’s reading 
deleted Johnson and Washington’s names or nicknames each 
time they were used; they were replaced with phrases such as 
“the guy who went into the store” and “the driver.” 
Washington argued to the jury that he could not have 
been guilty because he had an alibi for the time of the 
robbery. The evidence of this alibi was conflicting. The jury 
found Washington guilty, and the trial judge sentenced 
Washington to two consecutive life terms of incarceration for 
the murders and a concurrent term of ten to twenty years’ 
incarceration for conspiracy. 
B. Procedural History 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed 
Washington’s conviction, and the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied Washington’s appeal. In January 2005, 
Washington challenged his convictions under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 9451-46, alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel and a number of violations of his constitutional 
rights. The PCRA court denied his petition and the Superior 
Court affirmed, writing that there was no violation of 
Washington’s Confrontation Clause rights under the blanket 
rule set out in Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 
2001). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his appeal. 
On June 14, 2010, Washington filed a federal habeas 
corpus petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A 
Magistrate Judge initially reviewed Washington’s petition 
and recommended denying the petition on the merits. Before 
the District Court, Washington raised eleven objections to the 
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Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations. The 
District Court sustained one of these objections regarding 
Washington’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, and 
granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The 
Commonwealth appealed from that decision. 
This Court heard the appeal on May 15, 2013, and 
issued a precedential opinion on August 9, 2013. In that 
opinion, we highlighted Bruton’s holding that a “criminal 
defendant is deprived of his right to confrontation when a 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession names him, regardless 
of whether the judge has given the jury a limiting instruction. 
Although juries are generally presumed able to follow 
instructions about the applicability of the evidence, the Court 
in Bruton determined that a nontestifying codefendants’ [sic] 
confession that names the defendant poses too great a risk 
that the jury will use the evidence to determine the guilt or 
non-guilt of someone other than the confessor.” Washington 
v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 471, 475 (3d Cir. 2013) 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Wetzel v. 
Washington, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (citing Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 135 (1968)). We pointed out that 
the redacted statement of the nontestifying codefendant in 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), had eliminated 
any mention of the defendant’s name or her existence and did 
“not violate the Confrontation Clause because jurors are more 
likely to be able to follow a limiting instruction when ‘the 
confession was not incriminating on its face.’” Washington, 
726 F.3d at 476 (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208). After 
discussing the redaction of Waddy’s confession, we 
concluded that “no reasonable reading of Bruton, Richardson, 
and Gray can tolerate a redaction that the trial judge knew at 
the time of introduction would be transparent to the jurors. 
Taylor’s testimony clearly and explicitly identified 
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Washington as the driver. Replacing Washington’s name with 
‘the driver’ was, as counsel stated, tantamount to using 
Washington’s name.” Washington, 726 F.3d at 480. We held 
that “the District Court properly granted Washington’s habeas 
relief because (A) the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it 
concluded that the trial court had properly admitted into 
evidence redacted nontestifying coconspirator testimony and 
(B) that error substantially and injuriously affected 
Washington’s case.” Id. at 475. We then affirmed the District 
Court’s order and instructed the Commonwealth to either 
release or retry Washington within 120 days. The 
Commonwealth was subsequently granted a writ of certiorari 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, which vacated this 
Court’s judgment and remanded the case to this Court for 
further consideration in light of White v. Woodall. We 
requested supplemental briefing and reargument from the 
parties in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 and this Court has jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s order granting the conditional writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We conduct a 
plenary review of the District Court’s legal conclusion that 
the state court decision was an unreasonable application of 
federal law as established by the holdings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 
210, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. 
Washington seeks relief on the ground that his Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated by the state court’s 
admission of a codefendant’s improperly redacted confession 
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and argues that we are not precluded from granting relief 
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, because the state court’s admission of this confession 
was an unreasonable application of clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The 
Commonwealth argues that, in light of White, we must now 
consider whether the state court’s analysis of Washington’s 
Confrontation Clause claim was a reasonable application 
of that precedent. Washington argues that he is entitled to 
relief, even post-White. As directed by the Supreme Court, we 
now reconsider Washington’s claim for federal habeas relief 
in light of White. 
A. 
In this case we must determine whether the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied federal 
law as established by the holdings of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. “This standard . . . is difficult to meet.” 
Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786 (2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “In this context, clearly established 
law signifies the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 
Supreme Court’s] decisions.” Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 
1181, 1187 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “And 
an unreasonable application of those holdings must be 
objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error 
will not suffice.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Instead, the “state prisoner must show that 
the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 
court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). However, “[a]pplying a 
general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial 
element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule 
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application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 
specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 
have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 
The pertinent federal law at issue is the Sixth 
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to “be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The 
contours of this right as relevant to Washington’s petition 
were established in three Supreme Court cases: Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200 (1987); and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 
(1998).  
In Bruton, a postal inspector testified at trial that one 
codefendant, Evans, confessed to committing an armed 
robbery and had named his codefendant Bruton as his 
accomplice. The trial judge “instructed the jury that although 
Evans’ confession was competent evidence against Evans it 
was inadmissible hearsay against petitioner and therefore had 
to be disregarded in determining petitioner’s guilt or 
innocence.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 125. The Bruton Court held 
that a criminal defendant is deprived of his constitutional 
right to confrontation when a non-testifying codefendant’s 
confession naming him as a participant in the crime is 
introduced at their joint trial, regardless of whether the judge 
has given the jury a limiting instruction to consider the 
confession only with regards to the confessor. 391 U.S. at 
126. In short, the Court “recognized a narrow exception” to 
the presumption that a jury will follow the instructions of the 
trial court, Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, noting that under 
these circumstances “the risk that a jury will not or cannot, 
follow the instructions is so great and the consequences of 
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 
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limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Bruton, 391 
U.S. at 135.  
Next, in Richardson, one non-testifying codefendant’s 
confession to an assault and murder that was given to police 
was admitted at the codefendants’ joint trial. The confession 
was redacted to omit all reference to Clarissa Marsh, one of 
the other codefendants being tried at that time. Richardson, 
481 U.S. at 203. Further, the jury was given a limiting 
instruction to not use the confession in any way against the 
other codefendants, including Marsh. Id. at 205. Marsh 
objected to the confession’s admission under Bruton as a 
violation of her right to confrontation. The Richardson Court 
held that “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the 
admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a 
proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is 
redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any 
reference to his or her existence.” Id. at 211. When a 
confession has been completely sanitized in this fashion, the 
Richardson Court explained, “a judge’s instruction may well 
be successful” and “there does not exist the overwhelming 
probability” that a jury will be unable to disregard the 
incriminating statement. Id. at 208.  
Most recently came Gray. There, a non-testifying 
codefendant’s confession to beating a person to death was 
admitted after it was redacted by substituting a blank space or 
the word “deleted” for the defendants’ names. Gray, 523 U.S. 
at 188. When the confession was read in court, the detective 
who read it into evidence said the words “deleted” or 
“deletion” whenever either of the codefendants’ names 
appeared. Id. One of the codefendants challenged the 
admission of the confession into evidence, despite the judge 
giving a limiting instruction.  
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The Gray Court took the opportunity to delineate the 
boundaries of the exception to the constitutional right to 
confrontation. It wrote that in Gray, “unlike Richardson’s 
redacted confession, this confession refers directly to the 
‘existence’ of the nonconfessing defendant.” Id. at 192. It 
held that, 
redaction that replaces a defendant’s name with 
an obvious indication of deletion . . . still falls 
within Bruton’s protective rule. . . . Redactions 
that simply replace a name with an obvious 
blank space . . . or other similarly obvious 
indications of alteration, however, leave 
statements that, considered as a class, so closely 
resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements that, 
in our view, the law must require the same 
result. 
 
Id. This is because “the obvious deletion may well call the 
jurors’ attention specially to the removed name [and] . . . [is] 
directly accusatory.” Id. at 193-94. Justice Scalia in dissent 
noted that “[t]oday the Court . . . extends Bruton to 
confessions that have been redacted to delete the defendant’s 
name.” Id. at 200. 
Taken together, the current state of the law is that there 
is a Confrontation Clause violation when a non-testifying 
codefendant’s confession is introduced that names another 
codefendant, Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, or that refers directly to 
the existence of the codefendant in a manner that is directly 
accusatory, Gray, 523 U.S. at 193-94. That is because such 
statements present a “substantial risk that the jury, despite 
instructions to the contrary, [will] look[] to the incriminating 
extrajudicial statements in determining [the defendant’s] 
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guilt.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. But there is no violation if the 
confession is properly redacted to omit any reference at all to 
the codefendant, making it more likely that the jury will be 
able to follow the court’s instruction to disregard this 
evidence in rendering its verdict. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 
208, 211. It is against this background that we assess whether 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law. 
In many cases, the decisions of lower courts on Bruton 
issues are close calls that cannot be said to unreasonably 
apply clearly established federal law. They are subject to 
fairminded disagreement. This is not one of those cases. In 
our view, the confession that Detective Cummings read 
during his testimony was insufficiently redacted and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law when it affirmed its admission into 
evidence. The Superior Court applied a blanket rule, derived 
from Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 2001), 
that any redaction that would require a juror to consider an 
additional piece of information outside the confession in 
order to identify the coconspirator being referred to 
automatically falls inside the realm of Richardson. See App. 
at 72-73. This is not a reasonable view of the law and would 
permit the admission of many facially incriminating 
confessions, in direct contradiction of the rules clearly 
established in the Bruton/Richardson/Gray trilogy. For 
instance, Gray expressly instructs that the redaction cannot 
use descriptive terms, 523 U.S. at 195, cannot replace the 
defendant’s name with any kind of symbol, id. at 192, and 
cannot replace the defendant’s name with an obvious 
indication of deletion, id. at 192. The redacted confession in 
this case utilizes each of those proscribed methods. It replaces 
Washington’s name with the phrase “the driver” in some 
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instances. See, e.g., J.A. 268, 269, 270. “Driver” in this 
context is a noun used to describe the role that Washington 
played in the robbery; it is used to identify and describe a 
particular actor, much like a name or title. Furthermore, it is a 
kind of symbol—an obvious indication of deletion or 
alteration to replace a name that is mysteriously absent. The 
reference to “Jimmy” in the confession arouses suspicion or 
confusion when the other participants are called “the guy who 
went into the store with Jimmy” and “the driver,” though 
Waddy stated that he knew “Jimmy” for “like a good couple 
of years” while he knew “the driver” for “a long time, like ten 
years.” J.A. 268-70. This is such an obvious indication of 
alteration that it “function[s] the same way grammatically. [It 
is] directly accusatory,” Gray, 523 U.S. at 194, and “leave[s 
a] statement[] that . . . so closely resemble[s] Bruton’s 
unredacted statements,” id. at 192, that allowing its admission 
is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law. This “obvious deletion may well call the jurors’ attention 
specially to the removed name,” id. at 193, the antipode of the 
intended result of the redaction. 
Furthermore, Gray instructs that these rules apply to 
instances where more than one name is redacted, id. at 194-
95, and the rules apply even to those redacted statements 
where there is not blatant linkage, id. at 193. It is not enough 
to say that because there were redactions of both Johnson and 
Washington’s names that the rules from Bruton and Gray do 
not apply. The express language of the Supreme Court in 
Gray states that even though: 
[T]he reference might not be transparent in 
other cases in which a confession, like the 
present confession, uses two (or more blanks) . . 
. we believe that, considered as a class, 
redactions that . . . similarly notify the jury that 
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a name has been deleted are similar enough to 
Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to warrant 
the same legal results. 
 
Id. at 194-95. This is just that case. Here, there were two 
obvious alterations that notified the jury that Washington’s 
name was deleted. It therefore demands the same result as in 
Bruton. This is the case even though “the State does not 
blatantly link [Washington] to the deleted name.” Id. at 193. 
The jury did not need to even hear Taylor’s earlier testimony 
that Washington was the driver; it needed only to “lift [its] 
eyes to [Washington], sitting at counsel table, to find what 
will seem the obvious answer.” Id. Waddy’s detailed 
confession about the murders and the role that each of the 
four participants played, even though redacted, was so 
powerfully incriminating that it “posed an obvious and 
serious risk that the jury would, contrary to the instruction it 
received, weigh Waddy’s confession in its determination of 
Washington’s guilt or non-guilt.” Washington, 726 F.3d at 
481. As we concluded before, “no reasonable reading of 
Bruton, Richardson, and Gray can tolerate a redaction that the 
trial judge knew at the time of introduction would be 
transparent to the jurors.” Id. at 480. For all of these reasons, 
the admission of Waddy’s insufficiently redacted confession 
is in violation of the clear Confrontation Clause precepts laid 
out in Bruton, Richardson, and Gray and demands that we 
overturn the Pennsylvania court’s ruling. This was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as 
set out by the Supreme Court. 
B. 
Orders from the Supreme Court that summarily grant 
certiorari, vacate the decision below without finding error, 
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and remand the case for further consideration by the lower 
court (“GVRs”) are not decisions on the merits. See Tyler v. 
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 n.6 (2001). Rather,  
[w]here intervening developments, or recent 
developments that [the Supreme Court has] 
reason to believe the court below did not fully 
consider, reveal a reasonable probability that 
the decision below rests upon a premise that the 
lower court would reject if given the 
opportunity for further consideration, and where 
it appears that such a redetermination may 
determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation, 
a GVR order is, we believe, potentially 
appropriate. 
 
Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 
(1996) (per curiam). It is precisely this type of GVR with 
which we must grapple today to determine whether the 
Supreme Court’s disposition in White ought to change our 
disposition of Washington’s appeal. 
In White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014), the 
defendant “brutally raped, slashed with a box cutter, and 
drowned a 16-year-old high-school student. After pleading 
guilty to murder, rape, and kidnaping, he was sentenced to 
death.” Id. at 1700-01. At the penalty phase of the trial in 
state court, the defendant called character witnesses to testify 
on his behalf but did not himself testify. The defense counsel 
asked for the judge to instruct the jury that the defendant was 
not compelled to testify and the fact that he failed to do so 
should not prejudice him in any way. Id. at 1701. The trial 
judge denied this request; that decision was affirmed on 
appeal. After exhausting his direct appeals, the defendant 
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petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The 
District Court granted relief, holding that “the trial court’s 
refusal to issue a no-adverse-inference instruction at the 
penalty phase violated respondent’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. It wrote that “[a]n 
unreasonable application can also occur where ‘the state court 
either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme 
Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply 
or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new 
context where it should apply.’” Woodall v. Simpson, No. 
5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *4 (quoting Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000)) (alteration in original). 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court grappled with the 
contours of this aspect of Fifth Amendment law vis-à-vis § 
2254’s “unreasonable application” language. The relevant 
Supreme Court precedents were Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 
288 (1981), Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), and 
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). In Carter, the 
Supreme Court held that a judge is required to give a no-
adverse-inference instruction at the guilt phase of the trial. 
450 U.S. at 294-95, 300. Estelle was a case about the 
prosecution’s use of a defendant’s court-ordered psychiatric 
testimony to establish his future dangerousness at the 
sentencing phase of trial. 451 U.S. at 456. Mitchell, finally, 
“disapproved a trial judge’s drawing of an adverse inference 
from the defendant’s silence at sentencing with regard to 
factual determinations respecting the circumstances and 
details of the crime.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In White, the District Court 
analogized to these cases and held that by not extending these 
precedents to give the no-adverse-inference instruction at the 
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penalty stage of a trial, the state court had unreasonably 
refused to extend clearly established federal law. 
The Supreme Court responded by holding that it 
has never adopted the unreasonable-refusal-to-
extend rule on which respondent relies. It has 
not been so much as endorsed in a majority 
opinion, let alone relied on as a basis for 
granting habeas relief. To the extent the 
unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule differs from 
the one embraced in Williams and reiterated 
many times since, we reject it. . . . [Section 
2254(d)(1)] does not require state courts to 
extend that precedent or license federal courts to 
treat the failure to do so as error. 
 
Id. at 1706. As a result, it reversed the Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case. It was careful, however, to note that a 
finding of unreasonable application did not require identical 
fact patterns. “To the contrary, state courts must reasonably 
apply the rules ‘squarely established’ by this Court’s holdings 
to the facts of each case.” Id. (quoting Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)). “‘[T]he difference 
between applying a rule and extending it is not always clear,’ 
but ‘[c]ertain principles are fundamental enough that when 
new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the 
earlier rule will be beyond doubt.’” Id. (quoting Yarborough, 
541 U.S. at 666) (alterations in original). 
Our opinion merely utilizes the “unreasonable 
application” concept; we do not apply the “unreasonable-
refusal-to-extend” concept. We have repeatedly explained 
that § 2254 limits habeas relief to cases where the state 
court’s conclusion was an unreasonable application of that 
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law. We hold only that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s holdings to the 
facts of Washington’s case. 
Though the Supreme Court has not provided 
significant guidance on what constitutes an extension of law 
versus an application, the Eleventh Circuit has discussed this 
distinction in Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 
2003). In Hawkins, a defendant was tried in state court for 
trafficking in marijuana and failure to pay a drug tax. At trial, 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in handling some 
evidence. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was 
granted, and then moved to dismiss the indictment on double 
jeopardy grounds, which was denied. The defendant was 
subsequently convicted.  
 Hawkins pursued a petition for post-conviction relief 
in federal court. The district court concluded that the state 
court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law 
because it unreasonably refused to extend the rule from 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), which held that 
intent of the prosecutor is the standard in determining whether 
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. Id. at 675-76. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the Kennedy rule applied only to 
plain, unconcealed prosecutorial misconduct, writing that 
“[t]he prosecutor’s misconduct in [Hawkins] is materially 
different from that described in Kennedy and is not—to say 
the least—clearly covered by the Kennedy rule.” Hawkins, 
318 F.3d at 1308.  
 This is one of the few examples of an unreasonable 
refusal to extend Supreme Court precedent. It teaches us that 
we are permitted by § 2254(d)(1) to apply the rationales of 
Supreme Court decisions to new and different facts and 
circumstances as long as “the new facts and circumstances . . 
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. [are] substantially the same that were in the mind of the 
Supreme Court when it laid down the rule. . . . [However, t]o 
widen the scope of or to enlarge Supreme Court rules” is 
impermissible. Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 
29:40 (2014). 
In many cases, “it will be hard to distinguish a decision 
involving an unreasonable extension of a legal principle from 
a decision involving an unreasonable application of law to 
facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 408. Therefore, our touchstone is 
whether or not the legal principles from the Supreme Court 
cases at issue here are fundamental. See Yarborough, 541 
U.S. at 666. 
Recall that in White the state court refused to give a 
no-adverse-inference instruction at the penalty phase, when 
the applicable Supreme Court precedent only required a no-
adverse-inference instruction at the guilt phase. The lower 
courts labeled this an unreasonable refusal to extend Supreme 
Court precedent, not an unreasonable application of this 
precedent. When contrasted with White, it becomes clear why 
the case here is properly categorized as an unreasonable-
application case, not an unreasonable-refusal-to-extend case. 
Instead of finding that the state court has not appropriately 
extended Bruton, Richardson, and Gray to a unique new legal 
situation, we instead admonish it for refusing to apply these 
well-established precedents to a slightly different factual 
situation—a redacted confession using generic terms and 
terms describing the defendant’s role in the crime that a jury, 
despite instruction, is unlikely to forget in deciding 
Washington’s culpability. The circumstances here constitute 
merely a factual permutation requiring the application of 
well-settled, fundamental legal principles, and therefore our 
holding is based on the Superior Court’s unreasonable 
application of well-established federal law as defined by the 
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Supreme Court, not on an unreasonable refusal to extend this 
law. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (cautioning that § 2254(d)(1) 
does not require an “identical factual pattern before a legal 
rule must be applied” and reiterating that “[c]ertain principles 
are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations 
arise the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond 
doubt”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
The District Court’s analysis of the Bruton rule with 
regards to Waddy’s confession has therefore not been shown 
to be in error under White and the dictates of § 2254. 
C. 
Having concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court unreasonably applied federal law as established by the 
holdings of the Supreme Court, we turn to assess whether the 
Bruton error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 623 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means 
that there “must be more than a reasonable probability that 
the error was harmful . . . [and] the court must find that the 
defendant was actually prejudiced by the error.” Davis v. 
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
“If, when all is said and done, the [court’s] conviction 
is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but 
very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand.” 
O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) 
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 
(1946)) (alteration in original). “But if we have ‘grave doubt’ 
about whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict, we must conclude 
that the error was not harmless.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 
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248, 260 (3d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has cautioned 
that “the uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it 
were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.” O’Neal, 513 
U.S. at 435. We must conduct our own harmless error 
analysis. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2008).  
When conducting that review, it is important to note 
that there was conflicting evidence pertaining to 
Washington’s alibi presented at trial. Washington contended 
that he had been visiting his father at the hospital at the time 
of the robbery. There was some doubt from the paramedics 
who transported his father to the hospital, neighbors, and 
other family members who had visited the hospital as to the 
veracity of this contention. Further, at trial the only 
significant evidence against Washington came from Taylor’s 
testimony. This testimony suffers from significant credibility 
problems, because of Taylor’s history of drug and alcohol 
abuse, as well as Taylor’s inherent incentive to minimize his 
own culpability as a participant in the events he described.  
The Commonwealth argues that the redaction error 
cannot have caused a “substantial and injurious effect” for 
three reasons. First, it says that the Commonwealth had a 
relatively light evidentiary burden to carry. This, however, 
dramatically understates the corroborative effect of Waddy’s 
confession on Taylor’s less-than-credible statement. Second, 
it says that Taylor’s testimony standing alone is sufficient 
evidence against Washington, so Waddy’s statement could 
not be consequential. This argument is unpersuasive, as it 
appears likely that Waddy’s confession, when viewed in 
tandem with Taylor’s statement, “had substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Finally, the Commonwealth argues that Washington 
presented a weak rebuttal of character evidence and a 
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hopelessly contradictory alibi. This, too, is insufficient, for 
the Commonwealth had the burden of proving Washington’s 
guilt, and the introduction of the improperly redacted 
confession undercut Washington’s effort to raise doubts about 
the credibility of Taylor’s testimony. Moreover, Waddy’s 
confession made Washington more culpable. Taylor 
identified Washington as the driver. Waddy said he was the 
driver, and that after hearing the shots, he entered the building 
(presumably skirting the victims, one of whom was clinging 
to life) and recovered the safe. This is testimony that a jury 
would have difficulty forgetting in deciding Washington’s 
culpability. 
This is a similar situation to that in Vazquez v. Wilson, 
550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008), where this Court found that a 
Bruton violation caused a “substantial and injurious effect” 
even when there was ballistic evidence, fingerprint evidence, 
and other evidence at trial incriminating the defendant aside 
from the improperly Bruton-ized statement. Id. at 282-83. 
Given that precedent, where there was far more inculpatory 
evidence and a similarly improper statement, we find that 
Washington has overcome his burden under Brecht and has 
sown in our minds “grave doubt about whether the error had 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury’s verdict.” Adamson, 633 F.3d at 260 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we must conclude that 
the error was not harmless. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the June 7, 
2012, order of the District Court. Consistent with that order, 
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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall either release or 
retry Washington within 120 days of entry of this order.1  
                                              
1 The Duquesne Law School Federal Practice Clinic 
ably represented Washington in this appeal. We thank the 
students and the law school for their service. 
